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April 26, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
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THE U.S.S. "PUEBLO "

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
over 3 months since the Puebl o was
taken j.nto custody and the American
crewmembers were imprisoned by North
Korea. Fifteen meetings have been held
to date on this issue at Panmunjom. As
spokesmen for the U.N. command in
Korea, our military representatives have
made demands for the release of the
crew. The North Korean military representatives have countered with charges
and demands of their own. Back and
forth has gone the football of recrimination. All the while, the Americans who
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were aboard the Pueblo have remained
in the custody of the North Koreans.
The Pueblo incident should not be permitted to recede from our attention. In a
direct and immediate sense, there is a
compelling and continuing responsib!l!ty
to the crew members who are interned
in North Korea. The return of these
men-alive-ought to be, and is, the primary concezn of this Government.
After all, it is no secret that the Pueblo
was sent, on orders, into a position almost within sight of the North Korean
coast. Those are misty waters where
legal rights under international law skirt
the shoals of obscure intelligence operations. The crew of the Pueblo was exposed to great risks in the name of this
Government. Owing to them, therefore,
is every effort which this Government
can make, and is making, to secure their
release-! repeat--their release alive.
As I see it, the problem with which we
are faced is not so much to prove a legal
point as to pry loose a crew. In dealing
with the North Koreans, I would hope
that the asseverations to sustain the former will not be made at the expense of
the 'practicalities of the latter.
Insofar as legalities are concerned
may I say that from the information
which has been made a·<allable in Washington and at the United Nations by
Ambassador Goldberg, there is every
reason to accept, and I do, the content ion that the Pueblo wa.s taken in international waters and, hence, not legally
vulnerable to the seizure to which it was
subjected. In this connection, we have,
for example, the assurance of former
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In a joint interview with Secretary Rusk on the TV program "Meet the
Press" on February 4, 1968, he stated
that the commander of the Pueblo "had
the strictest of instruct.ions to stay in
international waters" and further that
"at the time of seizure, we are quite positive it--the Pueblo--was in international
waters."
However, Mr. McNamara in the same
interview added :
I tbJnk we c!Ulnot say beyond a sha.rlow or

a doubt at no time during Its voyage It entered North Korean wat.M's. . . . There was
a period of radio alienee appropriate to Its
mission !rom the period or roughly January
10 to January 21 (In other words for about
ten days prior to Its seizure) n.nd It Is In
that period that we lack knowledge and wo
will not be able to obtain knowledge or that
until the crew and the commander are
released.

This observation su~gests that there
could be facts beyond those presently
known to us. These facts, I bel!eve, might
conceivably place the Incident in a context which would dif!er from our present
understanding. In any event, some such
contention apparently constitutes North
Korea's alleged justification for the seizure of the vessel. According to the North
Koreans, moreover, it is a contention
which is supported by crewmen of the
ship, though, on the basis of correspondence which I have received and other
Senators have received, I doubt that the
val!dity of the alleged contention by
crew members very seriously.
We do not, however, have to grope in
the dark on this point. The unknowns in

this Issue are not beyond the knowing.
To know all the relevant facts, moreover,
it may not be necessary to await the
release of the crew and commander, as
was suggested by both former Secretary
McNamara and Secretary Rusk. There
might be a preliminary way to clarification which, in turn, could lead to a settlement of the Issue.
It involves, I should think, the temporary suspending of the meetings at
Panmunjom on the Pueblo matter. These
meetings have been fruitless, in any
event, insofar as gaining the release of
the crew. The problem of the Pueblo is
distinct from other questions of the
maintenance of the military truce at the
38th parallel, which is the primary concern of the U.N. command-North Korean meetings at P anmunjom. In the
first place, the issues of the Pueblo seizure involve only U.S. personnel, not
U.N. personnel. Moreover, the crew of
the Pueblo, apparently, was not engaged
in or even based in Korea. Finally, the
United Nations Organization in New
York which has ultimate responsibility
for the U.N. operation in Korea and,
hence, for participation in the talks at
Panmunjom, has been unw!lling to consider the matter of the Pueblo.
In these circumstances, the negotiations concerning the seized vessel and
the release of its crew might be more
effectively conducted in other diplomatic
channels, as they undoubtedly are,
rather than through U.N.-Korean command spokesmen at Panmunjom. It
seems to me that the ne~tiations ought
to be handled by representatives who
speak exclusively, in this instance, for
the United States. Indeed, it would appear most desirable ln this connection
that North Korea be asked directly by
this Nation to admit a special U.S. mission for the purpose of interviewing the
interned crew members. In that fashion, it should be possible to determine
to our satisfaction what may have transpired, during the days of radio silence,
and any other relevant facts which
have not heretofore been available. We
would no longer be Mgot!ating, so to
speak, in the dark. We would have the
complete understanding of the situation which, as the former Secretary of
Defense has frankly acknowledged, we
do not have now. This understanding
would provide a basis for a full and unemotional evaluation of all contentions
surrounding the Pueblo incident. From
that, it is conceivable that there might
come a peaceful resolution of this mfated episode.
If the release of the crewmen is the
pnmary objective, and I know of no
other of greater importance in the circumstances, this proposal to send a mission to North Korea will be made in all
good faith. By the same token, if the
North K oreans desire a rational settlement of this issue, they will accept it In
all good faith.
A settlement of that kind is in the interest of the Korean people and the people of the United States. The festering
of the unresolved issue of the Pueblo can
only lead to gathering complications.
There is already a growing edginess
along the truce line which has brought
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patrol clashes and ca.sualt!es. The 38th
parallel in Korea is becoming, once
again, one of the world's most volatile
frontiers. One would hope that the
Pueblo incident, which is an incidental
but, undoubtedly, a contributing factor,
can be settled while there is st!ll time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that certain remarks I made at the
University of Maine on February 11,
1968, relative to the Pueblo, and also an
editorial published in yesterday morning's Los Angeles Times, entitled "The
U.S. Options in Korea," be printed in
the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SPEECH or SeNATOR MIKE MANsll'lELD, DEMoCRAT, Or MONTANA, AT THE UNIVJ:RSrrY OF
MAXNJ: CONVOCATION, ORONO, MAmli:, F'zBBUARY 11, 1968.

My remarks, today, deal with VIet Nam.
Before proceeding to them, however, I w18h
to re!er to the USS Pueblo Incident. When
added to the Vietnamese conflict, It Is lllustratlve of the hydra-beaded c~racter of
military Involvement> on the mal.nland of
Asia. War spreads readUy on that continent;
the dll!lculty Ilea In curbing !t. I would em•
phas!ze, therefore, that while the urgency 1n
VIet Nam Ill to bring one bloody confllct to a
close, the Imperative In Korea Is to prevent
the opening of another.
In the la.tter oonnect!on, It will help to
bear In mind the eesentlals or the PueblO
a.tfalr. A U .S. vessel-that It W88 a.n electronic llatener of 90me BOrt Is not d.!.apuied-was In a post t1on off the North Korean ooast.
What vital national need prompted the d.IB·
pa.tch of th!B part!culu mlssion or why the
ves&el went undefended are not as yet, fully
known.
All reports ava.l.la.ble to me In both the
WbJte House a.nd the Foreign Rela.t!ona Committee, Indicate that the Pueblo was In tn-

temat!onal water~~ at the time It W9S taken.
AIJ of the moment, the Pueblo Is now at a.nchor In Wonsa.n harbor a.nd the 82 Blll'Viving
crewmen who were aboa.rd.-<me other has
died-are Interned In North Korea. That Ineluctable !act !.s In no way altered by ueru;e
ot outrage or lndign.a.t!an.
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying
out a dangerous assignment. The "why" and
the "how" ot the mission are moot at th.l.6
point. What mattem now Is the obltgat!on to
those men. In our roo.ctlons to the Pueblo
affair, llvee must not bedome the pawns of
e! ther pride or petulance. Every effort to
bring about their release must be made.
We will a.l90 do well to bea.r In mind that
the one war In whlch we are engaged on the
Asian mainland has become a eouroe of Immense grief. Any move whlch loods Into a
second VIetnamese-type conflict In Korea will
oompound the grle! but hardly serve the intere6t:s or thJs nation.
•
In sum, what moot matters at th!B point,
It Sjlems to me, !.s: ( 1) return of the 80-odd
American crewmen allve--1 repeat, a.I!ve-and; (2) prevention of a seoond war In Korea
on the pattern or VIet Nam which could the
more readily booome World War Ill.
The finn re6tra.Int whlch Pree!dent Johnson ll8.8 exercised from the outaet of the
Pueblo a.tralr has set a wi!Ml course for th!B
nation The que6tlon has been rn!Bed at the
United Nations Security CouncU by Ambas·
sa.ctor Arthur Goldberg It ha.s been pursued
at the Pnnmunjom truce site In d.!.scuss!ons
between our repre.;entatlves !Uld those ot
North Korea. Other channels are also being
tapped which might lead to the release of the
crewmen. In short, the President's pollcy at
this time Is to seek a solution by diplomacy.
It Is the course of prudence a.nd reason in
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what Is, at best, a delicate and dangerous sltuat.lon. It deserves every suport of the nation.
There Is no certainty that the present efforts will bear fruit. Other possibilities, however, may also be available. I would point out,
for example, that, if necessary, the ma.tter
should be pressed further at the United Nations which h~s had a definite responslblllty
in Korea for almost two deCCLdes. If it comes
to th.>t, it mny be feasible to seek Impartial
arbitration or mediation or a pre.qentation
of the entire matter to the World Court. May
I say that precedent !or the lntter procedure
is to be round ln a similar dlspu te two decades ago over the loss or two BritiSh destroyers off the Albanian Coast.
Whatever the specific recourse, In my judgment, the efforts to find a peaceful solution
In the Pueblo affair are attuned to this nation's Interest. What matters In my judgment
Is saving lives, not saving f<l.Ce. What matters
is the substance not the shadow of thls nation's Interests. • • •
[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 25, 1968]
THE U.S.

OPTIONS IN KOREA

The continuing series of ambushes staged

by the Communists within and below the
Korean demilitarized zone has taken a steady
toll of American and South Korean Jives, fed
tensions between Seoul and Washington,
and lett the North Koreans, who contemptuously r<>fuse to acknowledge any participation In the bloodletting, virtually unmarked.
The Incidents, In short, have served the
pw·poses for which they have been mounted.
And they have demonstrated agaln the Impotence of U.S. power In the face of relatively
low-level but still flagrant acts of aggression
by a minor state.
Pyongyang has had a number of clear motives In it.s escalated efforts dlrected southward since the beginning of the year:
It has kept alive the threat a! a secondtrout war In Asia.;
It has created dlv1slons between South
Koren.ns, who want to react in kind, and the
United States, which feels It must pursue a
n1uch more cautious policy;
It hWi embarrassed the strongest mlli tary
power In the world; and
It has ra.lsed doubts about security In
South Korea.
For the United States the greatest inhibition on the kind of retaliatory action that
would best reaasure the South Koreans and
possibly most dlssuade the Communist. has
been the confinement In North Korea for the
last three months of the 82-man crew of the
captured USS Pueblo_
U.S. efforts have been directed, witl1 absolutely no success, toward obtaining freedom
of the crew through political talks. The
Communists have been demanding a full
apology for the alleged Intrusion by the
Pueblo In to their territorial waters, which
would be an admJ.ssion o! the rightness of
tl1eir c~e. Meanwhile. they have been sha.melcssl.y and brutally exploiting the plight of
the captives for the most callous propaganda
purposes.
The op.tions available to the United States
are rew.
This count-ry can do what It has been
doing, I.e., try to negotiate the crew's release,
at the same time tolerating without re!Ktllatlon Communl't mnrau<llng along the DMZ.
It can meet tho North Kore~>n <lctnl\ntl rmd
1\.fH.•hlgll'n, hnplug to RCt t.h<.! cn,w hack n.nfl
tit ttn I'IJilHIVn

l'yOil!l .Vn llf(ll

~~t ronv,''!.t.

Wt"npon

ttgtt.lnet. rot.nllul.ory n.t:U•H~ Cnr LIHJ l>ot'd1·r uto-

bushes. But there Is no guarantee that even
an abject apology would win freedom for
the men.
Or it could respond to the border killings
by taking severe steps of Its own, In conjunction with the South Koreans. such actions could, however, doom the Pueblo's
crew.
None of these options Is attractive.
But neither Is the probability of continuing attacks on U.S. and South Korean
troops along the DMZ by a. regtme which
feels immune from any punitive response so
long as it holds 82 Americans hostage. Those
lives are lmportrmt to this country. But so,
too, Is freedom of action to respond adequcttely to North Korean viciousness. WashIngton may soon have to make the hard
choice.
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